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ABSTRACT 
The recent experimental results of Plott and Sunder (1982) and 
Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1983) on the ability of single 
commodity markets to "reveal" the underlying state to initially 
uninformed traders were potentially influenced by a design in which 
the set of informed traders was held constant throughout the life of 
the market. Hence the performance of uninformed traders in the market 
might have been predicated on their knowledge of, and the observed 
behavior of, the informed traders. The experiment discussed below is 
a replication of one market in Plott and Sunder (1982), with the added 
feature that the traders who were to be informed of the state differed 
fr.om period to period. The results are equivalent to those of Plott 
and Sunder (1982) in the price dynamics, while less conclusive 
regarding the acquisition and use of the state-price correspondence by 
uninformed traders. 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
In a recent paper on behavior in experimental securities 
markets, Plott and Sunder (1982) concluded that the rational 
expectations (RE) model was superior to the traditional prior 
information (PI) model in predicting equilibrium prices and holdings. 
In particular, given a market with one commodity, three possible 
states of the world, and three groups of trader "types" each with 
differing valuations on the commodity per state, initially uninformed 
traders were able to infer the underlying state from the current 
market price and act accordingly. In a related paper, Friedman, 
Harrison and Salmon (1983) observed that, given the existence of a 
futures market, the RE model outperformed the PI model in multiperiod 
single commodity markets as well. One source of potential 
misinterpretation, however, comes from the fact that, although one 
half of the traders of each type were informed of the true state at 
the beginning of each period in Plott and Sunder (1982) and one third 
of the traders of each type in Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1983), 
the same traders were informed in every period. In a more recent 
paper, Plott and Sunder (1983) constructed markets where all traders 
received partial information (i.e. given possible states X, Y, and Z, a 
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trader's private information would be either "not X" or "not Y" if the 
state were Z), yet the combinations of traders receiving a certain 
message in any period was determined randomly. Hence no trader could 
be identified as having some constant bit of information. In the 
single commodity markets, Plott and Sunder (1983) concluded that the 
RE model did not perform as well as the PI model in their respective 
predictions. Thus, given the fixed information structure of Plott and 
Sunder (1982) and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1983), one cannot 
ignore the possibility that, in these experiments, initially 
uninformed traders guessed the identities of the informed traders and 
then used their observed behavior to gain knowledge of the state, as 
opposed to gaining knowledge from the market bids, offers, and prices. 
In the experiment discussed below, an attempt was made to 
overcome this problem. The experiment consisted of replicating market 
5 of Plott and Sunder (1982), altering only the information structure 
so that each trader was informed of the state in at least two periods 
(out of a possible ten) and then randomizing over which periods a 
trader was informed. This structure was designed to limit the ability 
of uninformed traders to infer the identities of the informed traders, 
since in each period different combinations of traders were informed. 
Note that a single replication, with equivalent empirical results, 
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will be sufficient to conclude that holding the informed traders 
constant did not generate the results reported in Plott and Sunder 
(1982) and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1983). 
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2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The market consisted of three possible states, labeled X,Y, 
and Z, and three trader types, I,II, and III. Each type consisted of 
four traders, for a total of twelve. The parameters, as shown in 
Table 1, were chosen to conform to those of Plott and Sunder (1982), 
with the exception that the probability of any state occurring was 
simplified to one third for each state. Each trader had a number of 
information and record sheets, one for each period, which consisted of 
possible valuations (one per state), his/her initial endowments (held 
constant for all traders and for all periods at 2 securities and 
10,000 francs), and room to keep running totals of his/her securities 
and currency. At the end of each period, profits were calculated and 
recorded on a separate profit sheet. [Examples of these and a complete 
desciption of the design can be found in Plott and Sunder (1982).] 
Traders were told that the true state for a period was 
determined randomly by choosing one ball out of a bingo cage 
containing thirty balls, numbered one thru thirty. If the ball chosen 
was numbered one to ten, the state was X: if the ball was numbered 
eleven to twenty, the state was Y: etc. Traders were told that, in 
the interest of time, the sequence of actual states had been 
determined using this method prior to the experiment. 
Before trading commenced in a period, the traders were handed 
a 3 "xS" card containing one of the following: 
i) x 
ii) y 
iii) z 
iv) a blank 
If a trader was handed a card with an X showing, the value of the 
security to him/her was the X value, which would be paid to him/her 
for any securities held at the end of the trading period; if the card 
showed a Y, the Y value would be paid; etc. This information was 
private, and two traders of each type were informed of the state in 
every period, though the identities of the informed traders varied. 
Traders were told that the means by which a trader's private 
information was chosen was random, though in reality the information 
structure was predetermined, as discussed in Section 1. 
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The market was organized as a oral double auction, and traders 
were free to buy and sell securities as they wished, one security at a 
time, subject only to the "improvement" rule on bids (to buy) and 
offers (to sell): any bid by a trader must be higher than the bid 
outstanding in the market, and any offer must be lower than any offer 
outstanding, After a transaction was closed, the bidding process 
began anew. Each period lasted 7 minutes, with warnings at 5 minutes, 
6 minutes, 6 minutes 30 seconds, and 6 minutes 50 seconds. 
3. MODELS 
The traditional PI equilibrium hypothesis assumes that traders 
will condition their behavior only on their private information, 
ignoring any information gained from observing the market price. 
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Thus, for instance, if we assume risk-neutrality on the part of the 
traders, when the state X occurs, in the PI equilibrium uninformed 
type I traders should be holding all the securities at the end of the 
trading period, with a market price of 203. In contrast, the RE 
equilibrium hypothesis suggests that traders will condition their 
behavior on both their private information and the market price; if 
the state-price correspondence is known with certainty and is one-to­
one, uninformed traders can infer the state from the market price and 
thus can become informed. Hence the RE prediction, given the X state, 
is that the informed and uninformed type III traders should be holding 
all securities at the end of the period, with a market price of 180 .  
The reasoning is that the type I uninformed traders "learn" that the 
state is X, and thus are only willing to pay 120 (as opposed to 203), 
while type III uninformed traders also "learn" and thus are willing to 
pay 180 (as opposed to 147). Thus, when the state is X, the PI and RE 
predictions are disjoint. 
Note that, given the parameters in Table 1, the PI and RE 
predictions for states Y and Z differ only in the holdings of 
uninformed traders: in the Y state, PI predicts type II informed 
traders will hold the final securities at a market price of 24 5, while 
RE predicts both informed and uninformed type II traders will hold at 
a market price of 245; in the Z state, PI predicts type I informed 
traders will hold final securities at a market price of 320, while RE 
predicts that both informed and uninformed type I traders should hold 
at a market price of 320. Hence the separation of predictions in 
states Y and Z is quite sensitive to the assumptions of risk­
neutrality and learning the state with certainty from the price. 
4. RESULTS 
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The time series of prices for the ten periods is shown in 
Figure 1. The sequence of states was the same as in Plott and Sunder 
(1982) except that we ran only one period with no information (as 
opposed to three), which was the first period, and we did not 
replicate the final period. As can be seen, prices converged to the 
RE predicted price in the X states, and to the price-equivalent PI and 
RE predictions in the Y and Z states. When compared to the Plott and 
Sunder (1982) results, prices actually converged faster (and closer to 
the predicted values) in three of the periods, while converging slower 
(and farther from predicted values) in three periods, and were roughly 
equal in the remaining four periods. Thus we can conclude that the 
fixed information structure of Plott and Sunder (198 2) had little to 
do with price convergence, 
Table 2 lists the number of securities in the "wrong" hands at 
the end of each period, given the PI and RE predictions, for both 
Plott and Sunder (198 2) and the current experiment. Recall that the 
predictions for states Y and Z differ only in final holdings, so that 
the results in Table 2 are important in discriminating between the two 
models. As can be. seen, the RE model outperforms the PI model in all 
but one period (interestingly, PI does better in the same period as in 
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Plott and Sunder), Any conclusions drawn from Table 2 must be viewed 
with caution, however, for by the nature of the predictions, it is 
technically impossible for the PI model to do strictly better than the 
RE model in states Y and Z, since the set of traders holding in the PI
prediction is a proper subset of the traders holding in the RE 
prediction. Notice that the PI model does extremely well in periods 
6,8, and 10 of the current experiment, yet still cannot (and could 
not) overcome the RE prediction. 
Figures 2a and 2b provide data on the ability of traders to 
learn the state-price correspondence. Figure 2a shows the ratio of 
average profits for buyers to average profits for sellers under the RE 
model. As Plott and Sunder claim: "The ratio of profits of agents 
predicted by the RE model to be buyers to those of the predicted 
sellers reflects the degree of knowledge about the state-price 
correspondence . • •  therefore, profits of buyers and sellers might 
reasonably be expected to be equa� if the equilibrium-price 
correspondence has been revealed and understood". The Plott and 
Sunder (1982) data was used to conclude that the agents did become 
informed of this correspondence. The current data suggest that 
changing the information structure lessens the variability of the 
ratio, and more importantly gives consistently higher values in the 
final periods relative to the Plott and Sunder results. Notice that 
the large jumps in periods 4 and 5 come after a change in the state 
from the previous period, and that this jump occurs in both sets of 
data. 
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Figure 2b depicts the ratio of profits of informed traders to 
profits of uninformed traders for both the Plott and Sunder (1982) and 
the current experiment. Plott and Sunder claim that this is a measure 
of the ability of uninformed traders to learn the state from the 
price; i.e. their ability to use the inverse of the state-price 
correspondence. Plott and Sunder concluded that, over time, 
uninformed traders were able to learn the state, hence the values near 
100 in the last four periods. The current data suggest that, by 
changing the information structure, we again have lessened the 
variability of the ratio over time, and again we see the values for 
the final periods remaining above those for Plott and Sunder. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The results of the new experiment confirm the conclusions of 
Plott and Sunder (1982) regarding the price dynamics of the market; 
however, they also weaken their claim that uninformed traders learn 
the state from the market price. Figures 2a and 2b show that, 
although the markets become in a sense "more revealing" over time, the 
fixed information structure of Plott and Sunder overstated this 
revelation. Thus the conclusions drawn from their late-period data 
should not be made without regard to the bias introduced by their 
information structure. Similarly, the Friedman, Harrison and Salmon 
results on informational efficiency in the presence of futures markets 
could have been driven, to some extent, by this same phenomena. As 
for Plott and Sunder (1983), we can conclude that their results are 
derived mainly from the incomplete nature of the private information 
and the inability of the market (or the traders) to aggregate the 
diverse information into a state-revealing signal. 
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